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Introduction
The rising tide of economic inequality has become a growing concern in the
United States and around the world, giving rise to an emergent culture of distrust,
frustration, and anger towards the ultra-wealthy and the corporate elite. Talk about the
“1%” (and more acutely the “.1%”) has permeated our public and political discourse
following the 2008 global recession and the proceeding Occupy movement. Much of the
disdain towards the economic and political elite focuses around the concept of fairness—
the ultra-wealthy shirking their responsibility to pay their “fair share” of taxes; Wall
Street bankers signing off on “unfair” faulty loans; the “unfair” nature of the American
campaign finance system due to the recent ruling of unrestricted campaign donations
from Citizens United v. FEC. Needless to say, there exists a thread of belief that contends
that the modern capitalist system lacks various forms of moral, political, and economic
justice; many believe the greed of billionaires has contributed to economic inequality,
and the American dream of opportunity is increasingly beyond the reach of most people.
These popular sentiments are worthy concerns, but they are often without a fundamental
understanding of the underlying causes. More often than not, people place a large focus
on distributive patterns of resources and fail to adequately recognize the more
fundamental unequal distribution of power and influence. Thus, there is not a directed
effort to tackle the principal issues.
The purpose of this thesis is to show that in order to effectively address economic
inequality we need a new American revolution, creating a system that replaces corporate
capitalism with a system that democratizes society from bottom up: economic
democracy. In the first chapter, I will demonstrate that economic inequality has serious
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costs, specifically focusing on how economic inequality creates a difference in access to
resources and services, and also that it negatively impacts self-worth and social-worth. I
then demonstrate the political disadvantage of the non-elite that is created by economic
inequality. I contend that economic inequality also matters in that it is ultimately a
manifestation of the deeper problem at hand—the dominant power of the economic elite.
The concentration of wealth is a concentration of political and economic power, and an
egregiously unequal distribution of wealth contributes to an egregiously unequal
distribution of power. What is ultimately concluded is that the damaging effects of
inequality are emergent properties of the capitalist system, and the only way to remedy
this is to look to a system beyond capitalism.
To combat the fundamentally destructive nature inherent within the capitalist
system, it is key to look towards a world beyond the modern corporate structure. In doing
so, I propose in chapter 2 a type of economic system akin to that of David Schweickart’s
“economic democracy,” wherein both democratically run workplaces and social control
over investment act as the foundations of a new economic structure. Chapter 3
demonstrates how this new system greatly mitigates and ultimately eliminates the
dangerous costs of economic inequality. In conclusion, chapter 4 discusses how we can
move from the current capitalist system to one of economic democracy. Ultimately, the
goal is to lay the blueprints for a post-capitalist movement, one where the grievances of
depoliticized and disenfranchised citizens are resolved.
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Chapter I:

How Inequality Manifests Itself and Why We Should Care

I. Damages, Dangers, and Destructions (Costs) of Inequality
Economic inequality produces a myriad of physical, psychological, and economic
barriers to well-being and the realization of human capabilities. The question at hand is
not whether or not economic inequality is growing—both income and wealth inequalities
are rising at an alarming rate. Indeed, data collected from tax returns demonstrates a rise
in pre-tax income among the top 1% of Americans from 8.9% of total income in 1976 to
roughly 15% in 19951 and 22.46% in 2015.2 In terms of growing wealth inequality, the
past two decades have proved even more unequal. In terms of total wealth, according to
Forbes 400, the inflation-adjusted net worth of America’s richest 400 individuals rose
from $506 billion in 1995 to $1.6 trillion in 20073 and again to $2 trillion by 2013.4 In
comparative terms, in 2010, the top fifth of all Americans owned 88.9% of all U.S.
wealth—the top 1% owning 36.7% of total U.S. wealth.5 The figures themselves are
demonstrations of the unequal distribution of economic resources.
However, it would be fallacious to suggest that the widening gap of economic
inequality is wrong only insofar as inequality’s manifestation as poverty is wrong in and
1

Thomas Piketty and Emmaual Saez, “Income Inequality in the United States, 19131998,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(1) (2003).
2
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, “Individual Income Tax
Returns Filed and Sources of Income,” Individual Complete Report (Publication 1304)
Table 1.1 (2012).
3
Arthur Kennickell, “Ponds and Streams: Wealth and Income in the U.S., 1989 to 2007,”
Federal Reserve Board (2009).
4
Alex Konrad, “Does An Inflation-Adjusted Forbes 400 List Have More Buying Power
Than The Dot-Com Bubble?,” Forbes, September 17, 2013.
5
Edward Wolff, “Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962-2013: What
Happened Over the Great Recession?,” The National Bureau of Economic Research
(2014).
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of itself. Harry Frankfurt’s book On Inequality suggests as much.6 In this work, Frankfurt
contends that economic inequality is not morally egregious, and that instead we should
focus our efforts on reducing poverty, not creating a more economically equal society. If
this were the case, then raising the bottom line and working to rid the world of poverty—
not focusing on inequality—would be sufficient enough to solve the problems of
capitalism. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the rising tide of economic inequality
comes with a burden of additional harms. While Frankfurt certainly is right in contending
that poverty matters, he fails to recognize that economic inequality, and thus an unequal
distribution of economic resources and economic power, comes with severe costs. These
costs manifest themselves in three key ways: (1) a difference in access to services and
resources (e.g., healthcare, education, transportation), (2) a detrimental impact on selfworth and social-worth (e.g., psychological problems and issues of social trust), and (3)
the ability for the economic elite to determine how the needs of a society are satisfied.7
From these three symptoms of economic inequality, we are forced into a world with a
lack of opportunity, a strain on basic human capabilities, and a widening gap between
both countries and individuals in the progression of human well-being.
Let us first focus on the discrepancy in access to services and resources in an
economical unequal society. In the realm of access to healthcare, the damages to physical
health are perhaps some of the most palpable costs that economic inequality breeds.

6

Harry Frankfurt, On Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).
The notion of “self-respect” comes from John Rawls’ 1971 work A Theory of Justice
and his focus on the “primary goods” of justice. Along with rights, liberties,
opportunities, and income, Rawls contends that the social basis for self-respect is also at
the core of a commitment to justice. This Kantian line of thinking focuses on treating
people as ends in themselves, recognizing and respecting rational beings. Social-worth
can be viewed as society’s application of this principle to all members of that society.
7
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Without the capacity to live physically healthy lives, the functions of human capabilities
are greatly reduced if not destroyed. Several alarming statistics demonstrate that a lack of
equality is associated with the loss of human life, capabilities to function properly, and
social distress.
Perhaps the greatest costs manifested by economic inequality are its deadly
consequences. There are multiple aspects of inequality that negatively impact health,
including reduced life expectancy, higher infant mortality rate, and greater risk of
diabetes, chronic lung diseases, and cardiovascular diseases. These aspects of inequality
include a lack of access to resources, the problem of reduced self-esteem and self-worth,
and the disparity in access to education.
Concerning a lack of access to resources, the Equality Trust’s Index of Health and
Social Problems shows that even among high-income economies, the more economically
unequal a country, the higher the infant mortality rate.8 This demonstrates that the issue
of premature death is not simply one of poverty but rather one of economic inequality.
The causes of these high rates of mortality are partially due to differences in access to
resources and proper healthcare—there is a clear link between inequality and death, even
in societies without a scarcity of resources.
It is also crucial to note that countries such as Cuba with limited resources
actually do quite well in terms of infant mortality rate and life expectancy. As an example
of the detrimental effects of economic inequality within a society, let us briefly compare
the poor in the United States with the poor in Cuba. Cuba, a much less economically
developed but much more equal society, has a 4.63 per 1,000 infant mortality rate,

8

Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level (London: Penguin, 2009).
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ranking them 180th in the world.9 Contrast this with the United States’ 5.87 per 1,000
infant mortality rate, ranking 167th in the world.10 Cuba’s death rate is 7.72 per 1,000; the
United States’ death rate is 8.15.11 Despite the limited resources available to Cuba, it is
clear that more equal distribution of resources can in fact lead to greater health and life
expectancy rates.
Within the United States, inequality produces similar results with respect to total
mortality rates. In a study of United States’ counties, the highest total mortality rates were
found in the most unequal counties and the lowest total mortality rates were found the
more equal counties.12 As the nation with the highest GDP, this bond between economic
inequality and mortality must at least partially be the result of the unequal distribution of
resources and services in a society—not simply one of scarcity.
Additionally, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) “Gini index”, which measures inequality around the world from a score of 0.0
to 1.0, ranks the United States as the fourth most unequal among OECD states.13 With the
median Gini index score set at 0.3, the United States falls at a disheartening 0.357.
According to the Gini index, the numbers indicate that almost 884,000 excess deaths per
year in the United States could be attributed to the high level of income inequality. With
9

Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Comparison :: Infant Mortality Rate,” The World
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2091rank.html.
10
Ibid.
11
Central Intelligence Agency, “Country Comparison :: Death Rate,” The World
Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2066rank.html#cu.
12
Diane K. McLaughlin and Shannon Stokes, “Income Inequality and Mortality in US
Counties: Does Minority Racial Concentration Matter?,” American Journal of Public
Health January 92(1) (2002): 99–104.
13
Naoki Kondo et al., “Income Inequality, Mortality, and Self-rated Health: Metaanalysis of Multi-level Studies,” British Medical Journal (2009).
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a Gini index of 0.3, the United States would ostensibly see 884,000 fewer deaths per
year.14 Again, what we see is a result of an unequal distribution of resources. The needs
of many individuals are clearly not being met, even with the abundance of available
resources.
What’s more, drawing on strong correlations between wealth and levels of education,
an American study found that diabetes, chronic lung diseases, and cardiovascular
diseases began alarmingly earlier among those who were less educated than those with
higher levels of education.15 Even those with eight years of education faced these
illnesses five to fifteen years earlier than those with sixteen years of education.16 This
indicates an important distinction between poverty and inequality—those with the access
to greater education, and therefore access to more resources, have greater access to
healthcare than those who do not. Between these numbers and the Gini index, it is
evident that not only poverty, but relative poverty, and therefore inequality, leads to
devastating health impacts.
The costs of economic inequality are not purely physical, however. There also
exists a destructive correlation between the inequality of a society and self-worth. A
recent Equality Trust study found that among high-income economies, the more unequal
a society, the lower the life expectancy of individuals in that society.17 This study
concluded that one of the most common explanations for this lower life expectancy is that
inequality places greater stress on individuals by increasing “status differences” and
14

Ibid.
Irma Elo, “Social class differentials in health and mortality: patterns and explanations in
comparative perspective,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 (2009): 553-72.
16
Ibid.
17
“Physical Health,” The Equality Trust, 2015,
https://www.equalitytrust.org.uk/physical-health.
15
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“status competition,” thus increasing the risk of cardiovascular problems and health
effects that contribute to “rapid aging.” 18
Additionally, according to a 2013 GINI study entitled “Inequality and Status
Anxiety”, there is significant evidence to suggest that the more unequal a society, the
more status anxiety there exists for all individuals, not only those at the bottom.19 Status
anxiety is a greater concern for poorer individuals, most likely due to the limited
resources available to them, but even wealthy individuals express high amounts of status
anxiety. Inequality places a gripping self-worth concern on individuals that has farreaching, undesirable consequences on society including increases in health issues, the
prevalence of crime, and social distrust.20
Social distrust is another manifestation of economic inequality that exacerbates the
social sundering of already unequal communities. According to a 2004 study, there are
strong correlations between people’s opinions on whether or not “most people can be
trusted” and how economically unequal a country is.21 The more unequal a country, the
more people are untrusting of others. This mental and social cost of distrust is a detriment
to society that has a cyclically dangerous nature. For instance, the same correlation can
also be drawn with the most violent and murderous areas of the world—those with the
most inequality are consistently the most violent.22 Individual and societal consequences

18

Ibid.
Marii Paskov, et al., “Income Inequality and Status Inequality,” Growing Inequalities’
Impacts (2013), http://www.gini-research.org/system/uploads/546/original/90.pdf.
20
Wilkinson and Pickett, The Spirit Level.
21
Ronald Ingleheart and Pippa Norris, Rising Tide (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), Table A165.
22
Goran Therborn, The Killing Fields of Inequality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013),
Table 1.
19
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of fear and distrust towards one another only generate a compounding effect, grounding
partisan boundaries, reinforcing class, and demanding a mental toll on the individual.
Both the physical and mental health impacts of economic inequality are devastating,
to say the least. Clearly, the health costs of economic inequality are not only those related
to access to resources, but rather they include a wide range of aspects across unequal
societies. Realizing human capabilities is made impossible in many instances by
premature death, and chronic diseases cripple the capabilities of those less fortunate.
With economic inequality on the rise, it is reasonable to suggest that we will see these
destructive costs manifesting themselves for years to come, even with the advent of
countless medical advances. If these advances are inaccessible to large portions of the
population, we can expect the costs to remain.
As a final comment on these costs, it is vital to recognize that the costs of inequality
are the result of a deeper aspect of economic inequality—those at the top determine how
needs are satisfied in a society. One of the most evident examples of this top down
distribution takes the form of transportation in the United States. A lack of affordable
transportation has wide ranging effects that stretch beyond an ability to move freely in a
society. The allocation of resources in transportation is cyclically damaging, reaffirming
of the power of the economic elite, and is largely responsible for personal economic
stagnation and a lack of social mobility.
If we look purely at the cost of transportation, it has a greater negative effect as we
move down the economic ladder. For example, “Low- and moderate-income households
spend 42% of their total annual income on transportation, while middle-income
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households spend less than 22%” according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.23
These numbers show both the high costs of public transportation and the unequal
distribution of transportation resources. Households with no auto access are also
“disproportionately poor and minority”, with 20.4% of all Americans below the poverty
line left without access to an automobile.24 Below the poverty line, the rates for
specifically black and Hispanic families raises to 33.4% and 25.0% respectively.25
The issue here is not only unequal costs and unequal distribution of transportation,
but also the social and economic consequences that result; the economic elite is in control
of the distribution of these needs. Because the cost of private transportation is out of
reach for many low-income families, the only other option is public transportation.
However, the issue here is two-fold. The economic elite is heavily invested in private
transportation (for reasons of profit maximization). As a result, public transportation is
generally limited and often not affordable. One effect is that many low-income families
are unable to either obtain or hold employment due to their lack of secure and timely
transportation options. This creates a system of non-employability that is difficult to
overcome. Another effect is that those without private transportation lack access to many
social and cultural events as well as to the natural environment. Thus personal autonomy,
social functioning, and interaction with nature are curtailed for those with limited income.
More importantly, the issue is that the economic elite is in charge of the economic and
political decision-making that allocates resources such as public transportation. The issue
23

Brookings Institution and UC-Berkeley, “Socioeconomic Differences in Household
Automobile Ownership Rates,” (2002).
24
Alan Berube, et. al., “Socioeconomic Differences in Household Automobile Ownership
Rates: Implications for Evacuation Policy,” (2006): 39-40,
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~raphael/BerubeDeakenRaphael.pdf.
25
Ibid.
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here of the economic elite making economic decisions that are damaging to the
economically worse-off highlights the concern of the next section: this elite undermines
genuine political democracy.

II. The Lie of Political Democracy
Economic inequality’s destruction of human capabilities and opportunities is
manifested in key, tangible ways, providing us with a platform for disapproval, concern,
and resentment towards economic inequality. When we see the palpable results of a
widening gap between the rich and the poor, we are right to react with contempt. While
these prices that we pay in capabilities are certainly detrimental to individual humans,
there also exists an added devious, underlying cost of economic inequality—it
undermines the political democracy of our modern republic and bolsters the political
power of the economic elite. This is not to denigrate the dreadfully real damages
mentioned in the previous section. However, we must also concern ourselves with the
degradation of our political system and the role that growing economic inequality plays
in the continuation and strengthening of both the economic and political elite.
Let us begin with a basic outline of the American political system and how it
operates in modernity. As a representative democracy, federal level representatives are
supposed to function as the expressive voice of their local constituents. These
representatives are solely responsible for promoting the principles and opinions of their
constituents in the Unites States Congress, thus acting as the democratic exemplification
of those who voted for said representative. This type of representative system is itself
lacking in true democracy, but it is relatively appropriate given the size and scope of the
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United States. However, it is the case that due to ever-increasing gap between the wealthy
and the poor, even our representative democracy has begun to crumble, and it continues
to do so at an alarming rate.
There are several key components as to why this has happened in recent times.
The first is simple—money wins elections. A cursory look at election statistics in the
United States over the last 35 years demonstrates this. In 1990, the average winner for the
United States House seat spent $407,556 to their opponent’s $116,665.26 United States
Senate winners demonstrated similar values in 1990, with winners spending $3,870,621
to their opponent’s $1,674,65827. As we fast-forward to 2012, we see even more
staggering results, with the average House winner spending $1,567,379 to their
opponent’s $540,022, and Senate winners spending $11,474,362 to their losing
counterpart’s $7,434,819.28 What’s more, the cost of elections is increasing,
demonstrating the growing influence of money on election results. The average campaign
spending for United States House winners increased by over $1 million from 1990 to
2014 and increased nearly $7 million per winner in the Senate during the same
timeframe.29 The elite’s buying power is undeniable: “Virtually all U.S. senators, and
most of the representatives in the House, are members of the top 1 percent when they

26

The Center for Responsive Politics, “Election State: Election Cycle 1990,” (2015),
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=1990.
27
Ibid.
28
The Center for Responsive Politics, “Election State: Election Cycle 2012,” (2015),
https://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/elec_stats.php?cycle=2012.
29
Ibid.
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arrive, are kept in office by money from the top 1 percent, and know that if they serve the
top 1 percent well they will be rewarded by the top 1 percent when they leave office”.30
Unless we are to believe that these top donors are better representations of public
opinion than the candidates themselves, then there is clearly an undemocratic process
occurring here. This process is not only undemocratic, but it is becoming increasingly
oligarchic—a concentrated few are progressively able to dictate the future of the United
States, promising large campaign donations with the supposition that public policy will
therefore be curtailed in their favor.
Given these statistics and scenarios, it is clear that most American citizens are
simply politically non-efficacious. For the majority of Americans, it has become
implausible to mobilize funds sufficient enough to generate real political change.
Whereas large corporations and the ultra-wealthy are able to effectively buy their
political influence, the average American is left with no other choice than to vote—a
seemingly irrelevant civic duty in a time of such monetary influence and power.
The modern rule is simple and irreflexive: with money, one has political influence
and without money, does not have political influence.31 Therefore, if we are to truly
function as a democratic society, we are only left with one option—negate the influence
of money in politics. Echoes of campaign finance reform have bounced around
30

Joseph Stiglitz, “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%,” Vanity Fair, April 30, 2011,
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105.
31
Certainly one could argue that money is not necessary to impact social change. While I
agree with this notion, there seems to be little hope in influencing much of public policy
without money. The changing of social norms, such as the debate surrounding gay
marriage, can be highly influenced without money. However, when it comes to public
policy issues that economic and political elite either feel threatened by or can benefit
from, money is almost entirely responsible for these kinds of changes (e.g. the repeal of
the Glass-Steagall Act, the introduction of NAFTA, military-industrial influence on the
Gulf War and Iraq War, etc.).
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presidential election debate stages for years, but we have yet to see reform in any true
sense, and even with the introduction of such legislation, this does not provide an
authentic bulwark to safeguard against monetary influence. Lobby groups, think tanks,
banks, and investment, pharmaceutical, health, and military industries could still utilize
their excess monetary resources to influence studies, media outlets, and politicians, and
thus continue to mold public opinion. These types of influence are still the result of
hierarchical, unequal economic society, one that perpetuates the fallacy of our political
democracy. The most detrimental effect that this has is that it reaffirms the power
differentials between the economic elite and the rest of society. With political power
comes the ability and need to self-preserve, creating a system of dominance. To find the
root cause of this, we must retract from politics back into the world of our economy.

III. The Lack of Economic Democracy
The initial source of inequality lies within the structural nature of the capitalist
system. Inequality of the kinds mentioned in the previous two sections reach far beyond
distributive notions of justice. While wealth redistribution and greater access to resources
is key to a more equal society, it is the case that there is an underlying cause of the
present distributive norm. Inherent within the system of capitalism is a lack of economic
democracy, out of which the modern distributive paradigm rises. The distributive pattern
of the capitalist system is clearly unequal, as has been previously demonstrated, but the
question should be focused on how this schema should be analyzed. Many philosophers
concern themselves with distributive justice itself, but fail to recognize that focusing
purely on equal access to resources does not address the underlying cause of this unequal
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distribution. Instead, we should be directing our attention towards both the distributive
norms of capitalism as well as what Iris Young identifies as the “five faces of
oppression”, or non-distributive forms of oppression, including what I contend to be the
capitalist command of decision-making power32. In analyzing the management process
within a capitalist economy, it is clear that there is a lack of equal, democratic decisionmaking power. Economic democracy, on the other hand, moves the enterprise into the
hands of the workers, allowing workers to share profits, democratically allocate
management positions, share in a national public investment fund, and ultimately make
the workplace a more democratic area of society. I assert that the lack of economic
democracy in capitalism is a manifestation of a deeply rooted problem—the power of the
economic elite.
This section unfolds the lack of economic democracy by addressing the
institutional issues that are involved in capitalism’s economic relations. Inequality is not
merely the result of the economic elite’s monetary and political supremacy, but also (and
more importantly) the non-distributive power that they hold within the corporate structure
of capitalist enterprises. The power that the capitalist holds in the decision-making of
production, investment, wages, and employment opportunities both reaffirms his or her
economic power and mitigates the economic power of the worker. In general, the critique
that I am offering is a systemic one: while the distribution of resources, relations of
production, and the corresponding relations of distribution are important, the unequal
power structure inherent within the capitalist system affirms capitalist domination and
therefore denies any opportunity for economic democracy.
32

Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1990), 39-63.
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There should be a distinction drawn, as Young pinpoints, between common
theories of distributive justice concerning the distribution of resources and those of rights
and duties. To place rights and duties, such as democratic participation in society, into the
same distributive categories as tangible resources would be to devalue and downplay the
significance of the conditions necessary to fulfill human capabilities and social
cooperation. The value difference here can be demonstrated by analyzing the
fundamental flaws within the capitalist system.
If we begin by looking at capitalist domination, it inherently entails structural
oppression and exploitation in a way that cannot be described as “distributive” in a
material sense. This oppression, as Young contends, is embedded in the fabric of society
and vitiates everyday life. Exploitation is not merely the result of an unequal system of
distribution; it is wholly based in the structural relations that manifest themselves as a
system in which the productive and intellectual output of the working class is
transmogrified in such a way so as to benefit and bolster the wealth and power of the
economic elite. The working class is severely limited to change the system in a way that
tilts in their favor. This schema goes beyond distributive justice—it is an institutionalized
system of unjust relations within the structure of the capitalist system.
By extending Young’s model to the capitalist system, it is evident that there are
three key elements of capitalism that contribute to inequality: (1) exploitation, (2)
structural oppression, and (3) relative powerlessness. The three are operationally
intertwined and cannot be discussed without a relationship to each other, but the
subsequent discussion is a brief breakdown of how these elements exist under capitalism.
It can be summarized as follows: exploitation manifests itself as the inequality of the
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distribution of material resources; structural oppression maintains, rewards, and
necessitates the exploitation; and powerlessness is both a result of and a cyclical
contributor to exploitation and structural oppression—it is the set of stiches that keeps the
system from unraveling.
First, exploitation—the systemic removal and reallocation of the products of a
certain group’s labor into the hands of another—is the basic function of the capitalist
enterprise. The capitalist provides the material conditions for the means of production,
collects the output of the workers’ labor, and remains in full control of the output, thus
bolstering the economic power of the capitalist class. Here, the unequal distribution of
resources is a contributor to material inequality. Nonetheless, exploitation runs deeper.
Because exploitation is tied to structure, inequality cannot be fixed through distributive
means—we must analyze the organization of the system.
Second, structural oppression is the key element that perpetuates this exploitation.
Capitalism is itself a scheme that forces the hand of many well-meaning people, driving
them to act in exploitative ways. The capitalist’s role is inherently that of the exploiter,
whether intentionally malicious or not. It is vital to note that this is simply the hierarchy
of the capitalist system—it does not function another way. To collect the profit of one’s
workers is to be both a capitalist and also an exploiter. If one is to become a capitalist,
one cannot help but become exploitative in the process.
What’s more, because the system is structured in this way, it is also the case that
many maliciously intending individuals can be properly rewarded for their intentionally
exploitative actions. To continuously increase profit, one must act in accordance with a
set of basic principles that are at the expense of others. Those who succeed will be those
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who are willing to act on these principles the most. Stepping on the backs of others in a
climb to the top is the integral nature of the competitive capitalist structure.
Finally, the economic elite is often times removed from the consequence of its
own actions. In the modern system of hyper capitalism, the big business owner is no
longer an essential part to the daily functions of the workers. Able to maintain corporate
offices and distance himself from the plight of the worker, the capitalist, whether
intentional or not, is isolated from his workers. This creates a detachment between the
elite and non-elite that then perpetuates this kind of behavior.
Thirdly, powerlessness is the bond that prevents a breakdown of the capitalist
system. Young draws a distinction between nonprofessional and professional forms of
labor, contending that nonprofessionals suffer from further exploitation, namely
powerlessness. While the nonprofessional forms of labor certainly experience greater
degrees of powerlessness, it is fallacious to claim that the professional forms of labor do
not also suffer from powerlessness. Under capitalism this is clearly the case.
Nonprofessional forms of labor often lack in creative work capacities, are less
autonomous, and are regularly devalued in respect to professional counterparts.
Professional forms of labor therefore frequently hold more power in autonomy and
creative capacities while at work.
However, this type of powerlessness is only one side of the coin. Both
nonprofessional and professional forms of labor suffer from powerlessness in the
decision-making power over the results of productive labor. Unless one sits on the board
of directors, one has no decision-making power in the evaluation of what to do with the
outputs of labor (be they material or intellectual), the hiring and firing process, and the
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amount of resources allocated to wage and salary earners. The nonprofessional and the
professional are both inefficacious in their work environment when it comes to decisionmaking power.
This inefficaciousness or powerlessness is both the perpetuator of, and the
continued result of, exploitation and the structural oppression within capitalism. The
inability to reallocate resources according to wants and needs, the inability to remove the
exploitative middle-man that is the capitalist, and the inability to directly decide what one
does with the fruits of one’s labor is powerlessness manifested. At its core, the
dominance of the economically elite, which results in the harmful consequences of the
unequal distribution of resources, is reinforced by the exploitative nature inherent within
the structural oppression of capitalism and is held together by the powerlessness of the
non-elite.
Leaving behind the distributive paradigm and focusing on Young’s principles
presents us with three main problems for those working in capitalist society. The
powerlessness inherent in the system contributes to (1) a lack of economic security, (2)
overwork, and (3) few workplace rights. The crucial issue is therefore the fact that
economic inequality is not merely about inequality of possession. Rather, those who have
wealth control investment, profits, and have full control over the decisions regarding the
output of labor.
The lack of economic security for working individuals manifests itself in several
ways. First, because of the power differentials in the capitalist system, there is a lack of
job security. Without a democratic say in the hiring and firing process, workers are at the
mercy of decisions made by the board of directors or managers. Regardless of the amount
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of time and effort invested in a certain company, a worker is powerless in the prospect of
job security. So long as these power differentials exist, the average worker is not
guaranteed job security whether he or she has worked with the company for ten months
or ten years. Those with the concentration of wealth, and therefore the concentration of
power, are able to oversee the hiring and firing process, regardless of that person’s
amount of time and effort expended in the name of the company. In this way, these
differentials create a plutocratic work environment where wealth has a greater value than
loyalty, work experience, or work knowledge in terms of job security.
More crucially, the problem of capital flight threatens job security. The workers’
lack of control over investment makes them unable to manage the outward movement of
jobs to other cities or other nations. This threat is not simply a short-term threat either. If
we concern ourselves with sustainable economic security on a large scale, the lack of
control over investment is a growing concern. Capital flight away from cities like Detroit
and Baltimore to countries like China and Brazil are demonstrable consequences of a lack
of worker controlled investment and decision-making regarding the direction of company
goals. What’s more, the disappearance of pension plans and the shift towards definedcontribution plans (where employees and employers contribute to the retirement pot) are
decisions made by employees in an effort to cut costs; yet, these decisions dramatically
reduce the economic security of workers without their expressed consent. The ability of
the economic elite to create economically vulnerable and negative circumstances for the
non-elite is the manifestation of an economic system that is markedly unequal in
workplace decision-making processes and power differentials.
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Second, workers suffer from a lack of voice in their work. Work is allocated to
laborers depending on the needs of the company, but they are not allocated through
democratic means. The delegation of tasks is through a top down approach. While this is
certainly an efficient practice, there is much to be said about allowing for a more
autonomous workplace. For example, companies that permit employees to work remotely
or at home at least three times per month are more likely to demonstrate revenue growth
of 10% or more in comparison to companies who do not employ such policies.33 What’s
more, an LRN study demonstrated that companies that allowed for “high levels of
freedom” were 10-times more likely to outperform other firms who reported lower values
of freedom and autonomy.34 From an economic perspective, there is a clear incentive to
increase the freedom and autonomy of worker choices—these include the ability for
workers to determine what projects they work on as well as the role that they are able to
play in said project. From the perspective of powerlessness, freedom and autonomy
practices in the workplace would partially negate this powerlessness by providing
workers with a sense of democratic say in their labor. However, these autonomy policies
are few and far between in the modern capitalist system and are symptomatic of a model
that is slow to evolve. Clearly, workplace inequality and power differentials are
antithetical to both economic prosperity and Young’s principles of justice.
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Overwork is another large concern that stems from the power differentials of this
unequal system. Not only do workers in the United States work an average of 46.7 hours
per week, but the technological advancements that would otherwise mitigate the amount
of necessary work are being used as an addition to workers’ labor, thus increasing
production levels even more.35 Salaried workers in the United States report an average of
49 hours per week, in many instances because employers do not need to worry about
paying overtime for those salaried employees.36 The technology that was meant to reduce
working hours is owned by the economic elite and is therefore used to increase profits
further. This creates an unsustainable system of overwork, placing significant stress on
individuals and exacerbating health issues. Workers who work 61-70 hours per week
suffer from increased stress and are nearly 50 percent more likely to develop coronary
heart disease than those working 31-40 hours.37 The workers’ lack of power in
determining workweek hours is clearly both undemocratic and detrimental to one’s
health. Thus, overwork does not simply affect hourly wage jobs, but rather the whole of
American society.
Lastly, workplace powerlessness typically means that workers often have few
workplace rights. There is no democratic decision-making in the institution of working
hours, break periods, autonomous control over job function, or creative control over
work. This creates not only the classic effect of “alienated labor”, but it also means that
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the power and efficacy of union groups is critically mitigated. The ability to vie for salary
increases or working hour changes has been greatly reduced in many states in the United
States, the result of the economic, and therefore political, vying power of the
economically elite.
Not only do workers not have a say in the type of work that they do, but more
crucially, they do not have a say in the decisions of what to do with the output of their
work. The economic elite controls wealth investment, as well as the right to sell, and
maintains control over the profits that are generated through labor. Not only is this a
threat to job security, as previously mentioned, but it is also the structure that maintains
this systemic wealth and power inequality between the elite and non-elite. Without
control over the output of labor, workers are relatively powerless to decide salaries for
themselves, let alone their employers, CEO, or payouts to boards of directors. Thus, if the
decision-making power that controls the amount of income and wealth distribution in a
corporation comes from the economic elite, the end result will be a continuation of that
power dynamic. The negative consequences of economic inequality discussed here (lack
of job security, lack of a voice in work, overwork, lack of workplace rights, and lack of
control over economic output) take on a cyclical nature. Without the decision-making
power to control the output of labor and investment opportunities, the destructive effects
of an unequal economic system will continue.
If it is inequality in wealth and power that allows the system to function in this
way, then the road ahead is well defined. The costs of economic inequality are farreaching and detrimental to individual humans as well as humanity as a whole.
Sacrificing health, education, and the capabilities of human dignity are dreadfully poor
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excuses for the vacuous cycle of production for the sake of consumption. The economic
elite is able to make use of its unequal resources in order to vie for self-benefiting public
policy, thus exacerbating economic inequality and weakening our system of political
democracy. This has its roots in powerlessness and a lack of economic democracy, where
workers are placed into systems of insurmountable hierarchy, thus enabling capitalists to
form an economic elite that has this economic and political vying power from the onset.
Since we should care about economic inequality, and since this inequality is caused by
capitalist domination, we must end this domination and create a system that shuffles off
exploitation, structural oppression, and powerlessness—we must create an economic
democracy.
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Chapter II.

Economic Democracy: A Sketch

The goal of establishing an economic democracy is to generate a system in which
workers are economically efficacious, removing the influence of the economic elite, and
formulating a system in which the costs of inequality wither away, becoming a
phenomenon of the past. As previously discussed, one of the central issues with the
modern capitalist system is the organization of leadership within the corporate structure.
Not only is the present structure exploitative and unrepresentative of the workers, but it
also holds and maintains an executive power that is wholly undemocratic. Under
economic democracy, I suggest an overhaul and reformulation of the corporate structure
from what are currently known as corporations to what I will call Democratic
Workplaces (DWs). In the following section, I discuss the overall operational design of
the DWs, how they differ in content from present day worker cooperatives, and how they
are the more sustainable, reliable, and democratic alternative to the modern capitalist
enterprise.

I. Fundamental Structure of Democratic Workplaces (DWs)
The present top-down model of modern capitalist enterprises is an antiquated
system that, much like slave labor or the feudal structure, must be looked beyond and
overcome if we are to mitigate the effects of economic inequality, abate a corrupt
political structure, and realize a more equal and participatory world for all. Because of the
political and economic vying power of the economic elite, the first step in producing an
economically democratic society is thus restructuring the current system of hierarchical
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executive power within the corporate architecture towards one in which workers are
active participants in the decision-making process of the corporation. These newly
realized democratically run organizations, or as I call them Democratic Workplaces
(DWs), should be built around the following structure.
While the current corporate structure places the power with many of the most
influential and wealthy shareholders who elect the officers, DWs are designed in such a
way that workers in the DW collectively possess and operate their own DW, thus acting
as their own board of directors, electing certain managers to executive function positions,
free from external decision-making concerning the modes of production, the
appropriation of surplus or profit funds, or the salary and wage margins of employees
within the DW. The workers of the DW have the right to the profits of the DW as well as
the right to manage the DW, though the actual assets of the DW will be leased to the
workers from a publicly shared investment fund (this is discussed at length in the next
section).38 As such, all decisions normally confined to the executive functions of the
board of directors and executives are instead placed in the hands of those who
communally occupy and manage the DW.
For smaller DWs, it may be entirely possible for workers to simply act as their
own board of directors and managers. In these instances, we can imagine a workweek
where employees work their regular positions for four days (or less given the high
possibility of a reduced workweek under a system of economic democracy) and on the
fifth day the workers engage in the democratic decision making that underlines the
38
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overall function of the DW. This is, of course, an extreme example. Depending on the
needs of a DW, it may be the case that democratic deliberation may only need to take
place monthly, bimonthly etc. The ultimate decision of how to operate this schedule
should be left up to the individual needs of the DW and its workers.
However, given the notion that there will ostensibly be larger DWs (although the
tendency for immense corporate growth will be much less under a system of economic
democracy), it should be the case that workers elect their own board of directors as well
as managerial positions from within. Members of the DW may seek to elect, through a
system of one person, one vote, their board of directors and managers that serve for a
fixed term given the functional organization and goals of the DW. Thus, individuals who
are chosen democratically from within can represent the employees, and as a result,
employees can hold them responsible for representing the welfare of the mass of
employees. Without wealthy shareholders and executives in charge of allocating
positions to the board of directors, decisions will be made in favor of the DWs’
employees, securing the DW within the community, and taking into account the thoughts
and beliefs of the personnel. In the same way that small DWs operate, these larger,
representative DWs can allocate specific workdays for democratic decision-making,
discussion of business decisions, electing board members, voting on DW wide
referendums, and so on.
What’s more, if members on the board of directors fail to meet the needs of the
community and members of the DW, newly elected board members from within the DW
can replace them. Furthermore, given the needs of a DW, it should be within their hands
to decide which positions are up for democratic nomination, rotation, or appointment by
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the democratically elected board of directors. For example, depending on the needs of a
DW, certain managerial positions may be better filled on a rotational basis, or they may
be better filled through the appointment of certain position via the board of directors.
Nonetheless, the point is to develop a democratically run workplace where the
authoritarian nature of the capitalist enterprise falls to the wayside. This employs a
bottom-up approach to decision-making and it places true power in the hands of the
people rather than a few economic elite who are not beholden to the thoughts and ideals
of their workers.
It is important to highlight a distinction in the election of board members from
within DWs. The difference between what are sometimes classically known as “blue
collar” and “white collar” positions should be noted in the election of board members in
representative DWs. However, as Marxist economist Richard Wolff has strongly insisted,
it is rather antiquated as well as diminutive to relegate these positions to terms such as
“blue collar”, “white collar”, or “productive” and “unproductive” labor. Instead, Wolff
defines these positions as “surplus-producers” and “enablers”. I find it valuable to stick
with these or similar terms as they are accurately representative of the tasks that they
engage in. The surplus-producers actively produce the goods or services provided by the
DW, and the enablers act to support the surplus-producers in their endeavors. As Wolff
points out, these can include “secretaries, clerks, receptionists, security guards, cleaning
staff,” as well as more traditionally “white collar” or contracted enablers such as
“managers, lawyers, architects, and counselors.”39
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Even in a system of economic democracy, it is valuable to recognize the
distinction between these two types of positions as it can lead to a more equitable
representative DW. In these larger, representative DWs, as Wolff also contends, there
should be an allotted amount of slots on the board of directors for both surplus-producer
representatives and enabler representatives. Pushing this even further, given the nature
and the size of the DW, it may be necessary to continually differentiate between certain
types of enablers so as to secure true representative democracy and prevent the
exploitation of one group over another. It is constructive to differentiate between those
who produce the good or service and those who are a part of the supportive apparatus of
the operation itself—both production and support should be equally represented on the
board in order to maintain a democratic relationship between the varying aspects of the
workplace, thus avoiding a hierarchical structure of dominance that is present in the
current system.
Take, for instance, a DW whose members are nearly all some form of enabler, it
may be important to have enablers that represent the various categories. What’s more,
DWs may also employ various types of surplus-producers. In this instance, it is again
advantageous to structure the board of directors so that there is an equal representation of
categories so as to avoid domination of one over another. Beyond domination, it is
additionally beneficial to have representatives from all aspects of a DW that can bring
new, specified, and expert information in a certain area. The interdependence of the
surplus-producer/enabler relationship must be represented in the decision-making
process. While these choices must ultimately be left up to the DW itself given its internal
organization and difference among members, it is valuable to encourage and promote this
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fundamentally unbiased structure. In doing so, decisions concerning the future of the DW
will be genuinely representative and democratic.
Ultimately, the decisions laid at the feet of the board would be myriad in quantity
and kind given the nature of the DW and what is produced within the DW; nonetheless,
the basic components necessary within any enterprise remain the same. The workers (or
representatives) within the DW will therefore be accountable for the dispersion of roles
(both productive and support staff positions), the allocation and determination of salaries
based on the surplus or profit margin achieved by the DW, the allotment of surplus
margins towards growing the DW by hiring more primary producers and support staff,
and the distribution of surpluses into local community organizations that will further
benefit the DW and the community that it resides in. Richard Wolff in his book
Democracy at Work emphasizes the incentive that DWs (or what he calls Worker Self
Directed Enterprises) have for investing surplus value into community efforts such as
public education. He maintains that since one of the primary goals of DWs is to ensure
the reproduction and continuation of the DW, it is in the interest of the DW to “recognize
the need for all sorts of social supports if they are to survive and succeed”.40 As such,
DWs will be encouraged to be active participants in the community, supporting other
DWs that are necessary for their survival and pursuing community efforts to produce
intelligent, passionate contributors to their local society. Whereas large capitalist
enterprises are not reliant on the local community for sustaining themselves, they are
more vulnerable to the competitive pull that leads them astray from community
engagement, leading to capital flight and the failure to recycle capital back into local
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communities. Wolff insists that the DW type of collective arrangement will create
grassroots projects to sustain the community:

For collectives of surplus-producing workers to effectively direct their enterprises,
the workers will need the appropriate education and training for themselves and
for children coming after them. They may decide to entrust such education and
training to public schools sustained partly or entirely by taxes on their surpluses.
They will be concerned that such schools have curricula that stress the technique
and attitudes needed for collective, democratic decision-making as central to
economic activity and social welfare.41

This point is well taken and highlights a markedly important aspect of a democratic
workplace—we can reasonably assume that it would promote more communal
engagement, thus helping to politicize the disenfranchised and depoliticized. Not only are
workers efficacious in their work, but also the democratic participation in their work
encourages them to be more active democratic participants in local community efforts.
The level of necessary community engagement involved in a system of economic
democracy will be directly linked to local investment and job creation, thus empowering
local communities, effectively working to combat many of the economic inequalities
manufactured under capitalism. This mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationship between
DW and community will look drastically different from the current capitalist model,
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whose tendency to move to where capital flows and wages are lower is more parasitic
than reciprocal.
Symbiotic relationships between DWs and the community will be bolstered by the
relatively limited size of DWs. In comparison to the large scale, multinational
corporations of the modern capitalist systems, DWs are much less likely to gain such a
massive scale. This is largely due to the fact that under capitalism, expansion leads to
greater increases in profit for the owners; under economic democracy, profit sharing
simply means that expansion will lead to sharing more profits with more workers.
Immense expansion is therefore largely de-incentivized. Additionally, democratic
participation ostensibly becomes more difficult the larger a corporation becomes. As
such, DWs have an incentive to remain relatively small and local compared to their
largely distant and unengaged capitalist corporate enterprise counterparts. In this way,
smaller scale, local DWs will prevent capital flight and sweeping expansionism, and
encourage more mutualism between the DWs and the community.
What’s more, economic inequality under a system of economic democracy will
hardly be the stark contrast that currently exists under the capitalist system. Under the
present scheme, because boards of directors, CEOs, managers, and other high-ranking
executives maintain control of salary and wage levels, we have seen exponential growth
in economic inequality. According to a 2015 study by Lawrence Mishel and Alyssa Davis
at the Economic Policy Institute, United States CEOs have seen immense growth in
income in comparison to their worker counterparts:
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From 1978 to 2014, inflation-adjusted CEO compensation increased 997 percent,
a rise almost double stock market growth and substantially greater than the
painfully slow 10.9 percent growth in a typical worker’s annual compensation
over the same period. The CEO-to-worker compensation ratio, 20-to-1 in 1965,
peaked at 376-to-1 in 2000 and was 303-to-1 in 2014, far higher than in the
1960s, 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s.42

This immense increase in CEO pay does not suggest increased productivity, improved
talent, or more formidable forms of leadership on the part of executives. Rather, Mishel
and Davis suggest that these increases in pay are a result of “the presence of substantial
“rents” embedded in executive pay (meaning CEO pay does not reflect greater
productivity of executives but rather the power of CEOs to extract concessions).”43 Under
the capitalist system, these types of executive decisions, which unfairly bolster the
capitalist class and in turn exacerbate the economic inequality embedded in our society,
are not only legal, but they are simply a result of concentrated power.
Under a system of economic democracy, this concentration of executive decisionmaking and wealth would not be so. Just as real political democracy is valuable to the
reduction of inequality, so to is the democratic realization of our economic structure. A
system configured around the notion of DWs would most certainly institute both
minimum and maximum salaries based on the productive output and surplus margins of

42

Lawrence Mishel and Alyssa Davis, “Top CEOs Make 300 Times More than Typical
Workers,” Economic Policy Institute, June 21, 2015, http://www.epi.org/publication/topceos-make-300-times-more-than-workers-pay-growth-surpasses-market-gains-and-therest-of-the-0-1-percent/.
43
Ibid.

36
the DW. In such a system, it would likely be the case that ratios between lower-skilled
and higher-skilled positions are demarcated. These pay ratio decisions would be decided
upon democratically in the same way that all other functions of the DW are determined.
The Mondragon cooperative enterprise in the Basque region of Spain has a locked pay
ratio of 20 to 1 between the highest and lowest paid employees.44 This is in comparison to
the United States where the average highest to median pay ratio is 204 to 1.45 Authentic
democratic participation in economic democracy would therefore not allow for enormous
pay packages for CEOs and executives, would not force workers to pay vast proportions
of the profits in the form of dividends to shareholders, and would mitigate the political
buying power of the economically elite that reinforce systems of injustice and economic
inequality.
The allotted difference in shared profit revenue between certain positions would
certainly remain, but not to the extent that it exists within capitalist enterprises. Again,
representation from various work sectors within the DW can help determine democratic
means of distribution based on experience, skill, time on the job, and need, thus
decreasing economic inequality while keeping incentives for obtaining training and skills
for other positions. Additionally, Wolff suggests a type of job-rotation system that may
be beneficially implemented into DWs. The basic premise of such a system involves a
circulating schedule, be it monthly or yearly, between various positions within the DW.
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As Wolff mentions, this type of rotation system could be directly beneficial to the
development of individuals’ capacities. He claims that it would allow for “learning by
doing,” it would decrease the possibility of being alienated from one’s labor, and would
address the problems inherent in the “division of labor and specialization of function.”46
No longer would an alienated form of labor exist.
While I believe a rotational system may be valuable in many instances within
DWs, it is valuable to recognize that, in many cases, specialization can be indispensible
to productive work—not to mention that it can often appease those who are content and
pleased with work in their specialization. Nonetheless, a rotational system could therefore
be amended to a) rotate positions that are only closely related to one another so as to
allow for new opportunities, enthusiasm, and skills to develop, b) circulate directorial
positions and those who reside among the board of directors, perhaps instituting
consecutive term limits on the board of directors, or c) both. As such, a rotational system
would encourage more democratic participation and dismantle the feeling of workplace
hierarchy, increase freedom of movement within the workplace, and be fundamentally
more fulfilling without sacrificing the well-honed skills of specialized individuals or
uprooting people from positions that they are happy and productive working in. As an
eventuality, however, a system in which education and training is readily available for the
easy transition between occupations and skill sets in a society should be pursued and
realized.
Lastly, many socialists critical of markets will claim that under market conditions
there is still a commodification of labor, and therefore something akin to DWs still fails
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to alleviate issues within the current system. However under a system of economic
democracy and DWs where workers’ “wages” are simply a shared profit margin, this fear
dissipates. As Schweickart points out, within such a system “worker income is not a cost.
It is the residual; it is what is left over after inputs have been purchase, depreciation
allowances set aside and taxes paid.”47
It should also be noted that under a system of economic democracy it should be
possible for some capitalists to exist. It is Schweickart’s opinion that small businesses, for
instance, do not need to be run democratically. While in the long term, I find this
concession to be both unrealistic (given the work climate of surrounding DWs) and
undesirable, in the short term there may certainly be a need to involve small
entrepreneurial capitalists to have stake in the economy. They too would have access to
public funds, and so long as they could convince a significant amount of workers to
participate in an undemocratic workplace, and so long as the standing and additionally
developed antitrust laws are not broken, they should be allowed to participate in the
marketplace. As Schweickart says, such enterprises would not undermine the basic tenets
of a system of economic democracy, and the surrounding environment of DWs would
prevent the rise of exploitative and dictatorial corporations in the way they exist now. 48
Especially in the transitional period of a post-capitalist society, some small
capitalist enterprises will clearly still exist. In this transition, and afterward, however, it
should be the case that any non-DW cannot sell its assets so as to collect the proceeds of
an anti-democratic work environment. Under Schweickart’s model if the owner(s) of a
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non-DW is to sell the corporation, it will be bought out by the state in the value of the
collected capital assets tax that it had previously paid into, and then given to the
employees to be developed into a DW.49
Going beyond Schweickart, I believe it is important to use these funds to advocate
for newly developed DW opportunities for these employees first. For instance, if the
employees are unwilling to accept the current corporation as a newly developed DW, the
assets will be rolled back into the community’s social investment fund. However, it
should be the case that the former employees, for a specified period of time, have first
access to these funds to develop their own DW in whatever realm they want. This is
especially valuable in the transition period if we want to advocate for green energy
sources and newer technologies. Rolling over those capital assets, and providing
additional funds, into these newer, greener DWs should be encouraged, and thus
employees should be afforded this position, not simply the choice to take over the current
firm or not.
II. Capital Ownership, Capital Investment, and Markets
Before embarking on the quest to determine where to place capital ownership,
capital investment, and markets, it is undoubtedly essential to mention the distinguishable
positives and negatives of historic examples of both private capitalism and state-planned
economies. The Soviet style model of national ownership of capital and productive
property represents state planning combined with an absence of markets and DWs.
Recalling history, such a system helped to reduce levels of inequality, but it sacrificed
numerous political and social freedoms, economic growth, and failed to compete
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successfully with capitalism.50 Private capitalism, manifested in the modern system in
which we live, has produced commodious amounts of growth and greater freedom, but at
the cost of economic inequality and the devastating consequences that result (outlined in
the first chapter of this work). Drawing on this distinction, we must be aware of the
failures and successes of past thinkers and bygone systems of social and economic
organization. For example, a brief look at the market planned capitalist economy of
China has demonstrated that planning of certain kinds can reap large benefits. Since
1981, China’s economy has helped pull nearly 680 million people out of poverty,
although this trend cannot continue forever.51 It has been shown that the exponential
growth imperative within capitalism is both contradictory and unsustainable, but we must
look to accrue the positive benefits, however minimal, of the current system as we move
to the next. Nonetheless, China has failed in terms of democracy in the work place and
has been rightly criticized for its undemocratic principles. Thus, given the values inherent
in each system, finding a middle ground within which we can implement a system of
economic democracy is key.
In order to maximize the potentiality of a system of economic democracy, I
contend that we look to use and partially rework David Schweickart’s model of “social
control of investment.” Schweickart proposes a model that eliminates the often
mysterious and risky use of stock market investments. Instead, he suggests replacing the
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current model with one in which society as a whole has “social control of investment.”
Under this system, investment funds would be generated by collecting a “capital assets
tax”, which constitutes a flat-rate tax on “the capital assets of enterprises—land,
buildings, and equipment.”52 In Schweickart’s terms, the tax “may be regarded as a
leasing fee paid by the workers of the enterprise for use of social property that belongs to
all.”53 Language of this sort is constructive in understanding the communal value of
capital in a post-capitalist society. No longer is capital a revenue generator that remains
within one, small, powerful economic class; it is instead perpetually socially controlled.
The profit value is instead split into different sections—a portion of the value goes to the
workers, a portion goes towards investment made by the workers in the DW (e.g. new
product line, new technology, more space, etc.), and a portion goes towards the capital
assets tax. Thus, some of the capital value created by DWs that would otherwise be
hoarded or reinvested in a self-sustaining and non-communal way by the capitalist would
instead be used to reinvest into larger society.
As far as allocation of the capital investment fund, Schweickart proposes a truly
powerful model—one that involves nondiscriminatory apportionment of resources,
community based democratic participation, and the optimization of innovation through a
competitive market of non-essential goods and services. This national investment fund
would allocate capital to all regions of the country on a per capita basis, as in “if Region
A has x percent of the nation’s population, it gets x percent of the money available for
new investment.”54 In truth, this should be regarded as a baseline for society, as we
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should be able to overrule such apportionment if local, state, regional, or federal
democratic participation were to want to push for other “ethical or economic
considerations.”55
Nonetheless, this baseline allotment of investment funds on a per capita basis
should continue to flow downward until it reaches the community levels, in which case
Schweickart suggests that those funds are then distributed to public banking institutions
within the community. Under such a system, private banks would no longer be necessary,
as capital investment can be better regulated, meaning it can distributed in a way that
does not inherently benefit the economic elite and allow for greater innovation. Once at
the level of the banks, the market system that is acclaimed for its efficiency and
competitive drive for innovation can come into play. Banks will be charged with
distributing these investment funds on the basis of technological innovation,
sustainability, employability, and necessity within the community. Individuals within the
public banking system can be democratically appointed officials that will be faced with
meeting the needs of the community at large based on the investment opportunities that it
can make. Those who make use of the funds will be responsible for maintaining the
capital value of the investment, thus promoting successful businesses and creating a
cyclical nature of investment opportunities back into the socially controlled investment
fund for future use. Any unused investment funds can be placed back into the national
fund and be distributed at an at-need basis. Schweickart makes clear the benefits of these
public banking institutions:
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A bank’s share is determined by the size and number of firms serviced by the
bank, and by the bank’s success at making economically sound loans, creating
employment, and satisfying other community-determined goals. Unlike banks
under capitalism, these banks are not themselves private, profit-maximizing
institutions. They are public institutions charged with effectively allocating the
funds entrusted to them in accordance with at least two criteria: profitability and
employment creation.

The community at large may also make additions to these criteria. However, given the
benefits to be gained, it should be said that adding innovation, renewable energy, and
green technology to the list of criteria is something that the whole of society should
pursue.
Local, state, and regional political involvement are all key aspects to a properly
functioning system of economic democracy, and bearing this in mind we must prepare to
operate our politics in a much more democratic and engaged way. We can map out a brief
outline of a society in which resources and products can be apportioned by consultations
between participating members of the local political bodies. The community standards
with which the public banks must operate within will be determined through democratic
participation in these local political bodies. At a fundamental level, this would require
more free time (likely through a reduced workweek) and democratic participation in the
community, but it is entirely possible. As Terry Eagleton contends, more broad functions
such as “energy, transportation, and ecological policies” would be best defined through
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larger representative bodies at the local, state, regional, and federal levels.56 Such a
system would focus on the relevant needs of a community given its context within the
larger society. More importantly, DWs in this system will operate within a market, but as
Eagleton states, this would make for a market system that focuses on production based on
“social need rather than private profit.”57 As we cut the quest for private profit from basic
needs, we can move towards a more democratic and equal society.
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III. How Economic Democracy Avoids the Harms of Capitalist Inequality

I. The Benefits of Democratized Investment
So what is to be gleaned from our sketch of economic democracy, and why is this
significant in combination with the introduction of DWs and the removal of the capitalistrun, top-down enterprise? First, this type of investment apparatus does not inherently
favor the economic elite like the present stock market does. Participation in capitalist
forms of investment requires money from the onset, and money can simply be made off
of money, thus creating a system of capital generation that is not only exponential but
also systematically stockpiled. Under a system of socially controlled investment,
investment is accessible to the whole of society—one does not need to be in a privileged
economic class in order to gain access to the benefits of society’s capital investment fund.
Since we are principally concerned with the reduction of economic inequality, given its
inherent damaging effects, this democratized investment is essential to combatting the
current trend of economic disparity between the working class and the economic elite.
Second, this proposed model is decentralized so as to remove the fear of
undemocratic control. In contrast to strictly planned economies in which investment is
under state control, the investment model within an economic democracy decentralizes
this investment control in the truest sense. Currently, there is an understanding that the
stock market is truly “free” and therefore decentralized. However, if we consider that
52% of all Americans do not have a single dollar invested in the stock market, it is
evident that we either need to rethink our understanding of the word “free” or admit that
investment opportunity clearly is not universally accessible. What’s more, individuals
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who can invest usually invest through large institutional investment funds where
investments are packaged in general terms. Because of this, many individuals do not
invest in specific companies in the stock market, and thus one loses the ability to make
autonomous choices about what he or she wishes to invest in. The notion of “free” is
therefore strongly misguided, and those investment firms often dictate investment
choices.
While income inequality is certainly prevalent, the growing gap of inequality is
most disturbing and extensive in relation to wealth inequality. Wealth then, in the form of
stocks, bonds, and other investment assets, must also be made available to society.
Currently, wealth investment opportunities only exist for those who are wealthy enough
to directly participate in the stock market in the first place, and even under these
circumstances, the freedom of choice is considerably limited. Thus, unless we move
towards social investment, the current stock market model will continue to contribute to
an exponentially unleveled playing field.
Bear in mind that in an economic democracy, not only are we concerned with
democratic participation in the workplace, but we are also concerned with democratic
participation in investment opportunities. By allocating investment fund resources on a
per capita basis, this model prevents capital flight that leads to the degradation of
communities and their industries, and it also provides the needed capital to revitalize
economically inefficacious areas of the country. This is a truly free and decentralized
version of investment opportunities. Neither the reigning government nor the economic
elite has access or control over the stock market. Instead, the government acts as the
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dispersion apparatus through which the whole of society can actively participate in social
investment to whatever extent people wish.
Third, the market-style allocation of investment fund resources from a community
level via public banks allows for the benefits of market efficiency and innovation.
However, as these public banks are at the will of the community at large, there will be
democratic participation in decisions about banking officials. This democratic
participation will again prevent any top-down capitalist-like control of resources, and
banks will be concerned with appeasing the needs of the community. We can also
presume that this structure will discourage socially wasteful, selfishly incentivized
investment. In contrast, investment opportunity will take the form of new innovation and
development of real social needs. Since the goal is to create a society in which the
fundamental necessities are provided by the collective social action of society as a whole,
we need not worry about investment as a means of hoarding wealth or pension plans (this
is discussed more in the next section). In turn, social control of investment will be
focused on truly investing in society (sustainable energy, educational opportunities, space
exploration, etc.), rather than as a mechanism for obtaining wealth.
What’s more, these newly created public banks should house experts in business
and entrepreneurial innovation, acting as a type of educational institution for those
wanting make use of the investment fund and develop a DW. They could offer classes
and guidance with the development process, seeking to help individuals succeed with
their proposed projects. In doing so, banks would become institutions of civic
engagement and education, making use of its resources to benefit the community. Rather
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than profit-driven institutions, banks would become conduits to access the social control
over investment.
In the current political climate, the furthest left that discussion over banks goes is
to the notion that we should “break up the big banks” into smaller institutions, thus
making them more easily regulated and less likely to hold control over investment
opportunities. However, this line of thinking is simply not enough to combat the real
issues at hand. Without further reconfiguration of the social structure, the solution of
breaking up the banks could simply lead to reconsolidation of power over time. Given the
history of legislative rollback that is afforded to banks and the economic elite under
capitalism, this reconsolidation seems all but inevitable. If we are bold enough to imagine
a new scenario, the term “bank” could serve a newer, more equitable purpose, one that is
dissociated from the current intension of greed and recklessness in the pursuit of profit.
We should also consider several more key benefits to a public banking system and
public control of capital investment funds. Allocation of capital resources to regional and
local banks in order to encourage and create forms of decentralized public ownership not
only allows for more efficient use of resources by those in the region who know the needs
of the community, but it also mandates a type of collective responsibility at the local level
to help determine the needs of the community at large. What’s more, the political
viability of such a plan speaks to both liberals and libertarians, creating a decentralized,
grass roots, people driven democratic control of resources without the fear of private
capitalism on one hand or state capitalism on the other. It is entirely possible to imagine a
system wherein the public banking system works with local, state, and regional
workplace democracies to create systems of inter-community, inter-state, and inter-
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regional collaborative efforts, scaling them up to regional or federal levels to encourage
interactive democratic workplaces.
Furthermore, in the face of climate change crises and dependence on oil, the
public investment fund should look to incentivize certain aspects of our economy that are
otherwise stifled by the current profit motive of many large corporations. This could be
done in numerous ways. One could consider a type of resource allocation at the federal
level that mimics a small amount of planning—essentially providing capital investment
on a per capita basis and then additional funds to those in the sectors of green energy,
renewable resources, new technology, etc. This type of system would be decided on
through democratic representation and decisions made at the federal level. Additional
decisions may be actualized democratically at regional, state, and local levels as well.
Communities could therefore incentivize their own citizens to engage in renewable
energy and technology development by providing greater funding to such areas through
public banking institutions. Laws could be established that promote this type of
investment opportunity with a focus on creating sustainable economies through green
products. In doing so, an economic democracy of this sort combines the market pressures
of competition and innovation with the regulatory aspects necessary to overthrow
corporate profit driven motives that keep us dependent on unsustainable technologies.
With the good of the community and society as a whole in mind, we can move towards
abundance creating technologies without fear of losing profit in the long run. In
combination with providing basic necessities (discussed in the next section) this type of
social investment can produce a society where we increasingly produce beneficial and
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sustainable, rather than harmful and unsound, technologies, thus producing a better life
for humanity as a whole.

II. The Reduction of Income and Wealth Inequality
Let us draw our focus on several more specifics of economic inequality under
economic democracy. Given the destructive nature of inequality under capitalism, it must
be shown that economic democracy can effectively combat numerous aspects of the
capitalist system that produces and sustains economic inequality. How are these harms
curtailed under economic democracy? First, the democratically participatory benefits of
the DW are essential to dismantling the overall structure that helps maintain inequality in
the modern era. The structural apparatus of the DW will likely result in an apportionment
of surplus value that is much less unequal as we see today. This is evident in the present
examples of worker self-directed enterprises and cooperatives functioning around the
world today. As previously mentioned, Mondragon, for example, a worker cooperative
federation of nearly 75,000 employees in the Basque Country of Spain, has a highest paid
to lowest paid member ratio of 20 to 1.58 This is in the face of competing for highly
skilled workers within a capitalist economy—a type of competition that will not longer
exist under economic democracy. In stark contrast to Mondragon’s ratio, the average
CEO to median worker ratio in the United States was 204 to 1 in 2013.59 In some
instances, this ratio is even more staggering, reaching a 1951 to 1 ratio between CEO and
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median worker total pay at Discovery Communications.60 Under a democratically run
model, such immense disparities in wealth are sure to diminish, apportioning a more fair
and balanced allocation of profits to members of the DW.
Consider also the issue discussed in section II of chapter I concerning the lack of
political democracy and how this shapes economic inequality, reinforcing it through the
power of the economic elite over the political system. Under a system of economic
democracy it is quite clear that social control of investment and democratic workplaces
will function to combat the issue of lobbying power among a select few elite. While a
marketplace will still exist, and therefore inequality of a much less harsh kind will still
exist, it is not the case that there will be incredibly small amounts of people with
inconceivable amounts of wealth. Instead, the wealth produced by DWs will be allocated
amongst workers, the community, and back into the social investment fund.
It should also go without saying that campaign finance reform is an essential part
of protecting economic democracy, and therefore public funding of campaigns should be
instituted as a mechanism to avoid any reversal back towards a “money equals free
speech” model of campaign funding. Modern critics in favor of simply “fixing”
capitalism will argue similarly. However, a system of economic democracy makes the
possibility of campaign finance reform more easily realizable. A movement towards
economic democracy, where the elected representatives are truly elected on the basis of
their merit, their contribution to their community, their ability to represent their
constituents adequately, and where the economic elite does not maintain its lobbying
power, provides a climate in which campaign finance reform is more likely. This would
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presumably be the result of a large cultural movement towards the ideals of economic
democracy; as such, it is plausible to assume that the principles inherent in campaign
finance reform will be a part of this movement.
For example, a reduction in the income and wealth inequalities of society means
that the economic elite will not exist in their current incarnation, and therefore they will
not maintain the resources necessary to influence the political system as they do now.
While critics may claim that we can actualize campaign finance reform under capitalism,
it has yet to take root. Until it does, I remain highly skeptical of its possibility. Even if it
were to take hold, history tells us that the economic elite is adaptable and able to
overcome the regulatory legislation passed under capitalist systems. The rollback of the
Glass-Steagall act is one incarnation of the power of the economic elite to influence and
redact the regulatory power of the government. On the other hand, economic democracy
promises us something much different—a system wherein the principles of its
organizational structure inherently deny the power of money in politics through the
reduction of economic inequality. Capitalism necessitates a strong and consistent
regulatory element, acting as a bandage that is incapable of curing the underlying
ailments within our system. Campaign finance reform under capitalism and economic
democracy are fundamentally different—the former relies on strong regulation of a
rigged game, the latter simply proposes a fair game from the onset. Of the two social
schemes, economic democracy provides a greater possibility for realizing true campaign
finance reform.
Under these circumstances the economic elite and their political power will soon
disappear, thus leading to the reduction of political, and therefore economic, inequality.
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DWs will help realize a reduction in income inequality, social control over investment
will spur a reduction in wealth inequality, and the vast distribution of resources through
the structural apparatus of a per capita share of the public investment fund can guarantee
the provisional resources needed to flow into and remain in local communities.
Beyond the need for a democratic workplace and social control of investment, one
of the key elements of economic democracy is that it provides the building blocks for a
system in which fundamental necessities are provided by society at large. In such a
system, not only do we greatly reduce the negative impacts of economic inequality, but
also we provide the possibility for many other opportunities rather than simply chasing
the dollar in order to survive from day to day. However, it is currently the case that even
basic necessities operate within a market that is profit-driven. As such, capitalism forces
basic needs into the marketplace, allowing for access to some, and none to others.
Economic democracy, on the other hand, makes the possibility of providing basic
necessities through a strong governmental apparatus much more likely.
First, the reduction of income and wealth inequality reduces the lobbying power
necessary to maintain the private sectors of healthcare, transportation, etc. By reduce this
power, the possibility of universal access to these necessities greatly increases—the
profitability of these sectors can cease to exist without contestation from large
corporations. Second, the government can allocate specific resources for basic
necessities, and the social investment fund can be reserved for less fundamental
necessities. The public investment banks can incentivize and produce the funds for green
technologies, commodities, etc., but there will not exist a market for fundamental needs.
Concerning this aspect, Schweickart maintains the following:
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Representative political democracy of the familiar sort is also extended under
Economic Democracy in that matters of common concern that do not come up for
a vote under capitalism would be regularly considered by the national and
regional legislatures. How much economic investment should the nation
undertake this year? How much of this investment should be for projects of
national and regional scope?61

Under this system, it is understandably more reasonable to see the development of
national healthcare, transportation, education, etc. Without the influence of large
corporate entities, and with the extension of representative democratic participation,
many issues concerning basic needs can be more adequately dealt with. Thus, it is central
to economic democracy that it removes the profit incentive from the fundamentals of
human survival and capability realization.
In doing so, those things that are considered essential to individual and
community development must be controlled by the democratic public. This would likely
include healthcare, education, transportation, energy, information, public and DW
pension funds, and other areas of basic necessity. The funds for these necessities can be
generated through both the capital assets tax to help establish and develop the necessary
infrastructure for these systems, as well as an income tax. Additionally, healthcare costs
in the United States, for example, are third highest per capita in the world at $9,146. A
streamlined, single payer model paid for by a mix of income and capital assets tax would
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adequately cover the costs. Under economic democracy, the large influencers of
economic inequality (basic necessities) will no longer be subject to the competitive nature
of the market. Eagleton describes a similar system: once basic human needs are fulfilled
and allocated according to needs, “less socially indispensable goods…(consumer items,
luxury products), could be left to the operations of the market.”62
The benefit of such a society would be the reduction of economic inequality,
combatting the most deadly forms of this inequality (lack of access to healthcare,
education, etc.). Eagleton’s contrast of market goods is markedly important, as it
demonstrates that there exist certain “indispensable” goods that must be brought under
public control. To expose such goods to the market is to create a system in which we are
in competition with each other over basic necessities—a truly barbaric way of allocating
resources that are easily and readily available to the whole of society.
This is not a socialist pipedream, either. It is simply a recognition of the fact that
we cannot continue to damage ourselves by failing to provide basic necessities for our
citizens. In such a society, there would still exist a market for consumerist tendencies,
something that does not seems like it will ever give way. It is hard to imagine a society
where individuals will always want a bigger sofa or a wider television screen, especially
since we are entrenched in the epoch of copious consumerism. However, in a system
where we de-commodify human necessities, we can move towards a society less based
around our consumerist tendencies.
Under capitalism, laborsaving technologies have not been used to curtail long
working hours, but instead they have been used to constantly increase productivity.
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Under economic democracy, laborsaving technologies can play a role in increased leisure
time, as profit sharing within DWs means primary concern with getting the job done, not
how much time is spent on the job. Furthermore, as Schweickart states, “choices between
consumption and leisure can be freely made” within a system of economic democracy.63
As such, it is reasonable to consider that many DWs will make the move towards reduced
consumption in favor of leisure time. What’s more, while constant growth is necessary
for capitalism’s success, the goal of DWs is the maintenance of the DW’s value. In this
way, society at large is not forced to consume so that the economy can remain stable.
Economic stability under economic democracy simply means the maintaining of the
capital value of a DW—increases are fantastic, but not necessary. Thus, under economic
democracy, it is highly likely that consumption is reduced. Perhaps, given a cultural shift
in our attitudes towards consumption, in combination with economic democracy, we can
make a consumption based society a relic of the past.
Thus, under a system of economic democracy, it is evident that there must exist
universal healthcare coverage for all individuals. This, we know, is presently possible and
is in use all over the world including many countries in Western and Northern Europe, as
well as nations like Australia, with great success.64 Similar systems should be
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implemented to include education and public transportation as universally accessible,
publically owned functions of an economic democracy. Guaranteeing these universal
claims will greatly reduce many of the damaging costs of economic inequality from the
onset. Due to the damaging affects that economic inequality and lack of access to
healthcare creates, such a system would clearly alleviate much of the problem. However,
the power of the privatized capitalist system of healthcare is leading to a degradation of
these universal guarantees, such as the slow privatization of the NHS in the UK.65
Globalization and the influence of private firms present serious challenges to the promise
of universal access to basic necessities. Economic democracy’s inequality reduction and
democratic control of firms proposes a model where this rollback cannot happen, and
where these universal guarantees can be maintained.
As it has been stated, this will need a cultural as well as political/economic shift,
especially in the realm of transportation. Our dependence on oil and our need to own and
operate private automobiles is both a cultural and economic phenomenon that we must
overcome if we are to properly combat inequality and create a sustainable future. The
slow reorganization of cities around more closely tied networks commerce, housing, job
location, and transportation will take considerable time. Nonetheless, a system of
economic democracy can and will promote the slow change, as communities will be more
apt and willing to design their future cities around newer, greener technologies and in
accordance with a life that is more easily navigable. First, the power of big oil

health care is an economically achievable task, and one that can be more properly
streamlined than the current system in the United States.
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corporations will be curtailed by the removal of political influence by the economic elite.
Furthermore, as public banks are tasked with allocating the resources available in the
public investment fund, the representative government at large can more easily develop
incentives for green technologies. Currently, large oil companies fear the loss of profit in
the short term, and therefore the rollover of their resources towards green technologies is
much less likely under capitalism. Without the pressure of oil corporations, the
competitive market of DWs under economic democracy can be incentivized to produce
newer, cleaner forms of technology, and public transportation services. Thus, in
developing economic democracy, we can look to the example of places like Stockholm
where 74% population walk, bike, or use public transportation as a means of getting to
work.66 Economic democracy can work to spread this type of organizational structure
throughout large cities around the United States. In turn, the damaging costs of lack of
transportation will be removed, as citizens will need to rely less on private transportation
in order to access their place of work. Looking to the future, but also building on and
replicating the successes of the past must be a key strategy to producing a greener, more
efficient economic democracy.

III. Economic Democracy and Unemployment
It is patently the case that unemployment leads to further economic inequality,
leading to the negative consequences outlined in chapter one. First, the fluidity of capital
under the current structure of neoliberalism and globalization creates the constant threat
of job loss. Through the advent of technology, it has become increasing possible for
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capitalist enterprises to export jobs to China, Brazil, India, and a myriad of other
developing countries in order to seek lower wages. The scheme of capitalism is
fundamentally tied to this principle—if profit is what is to be sought, it will find the
lowest paid workers, no matter where or whom that may affect.
Paul Krugman recently argued that one of the major causes in soaring economic
inequality is the lack of available jobs as well as high underemployment and
unemployment.67 Since capitalism is a system in which unemployment is not only
necessary, but it helps to maintain low wages, Krugman draws a link between this
unemployment and inequality, arguing that the bargaining power of workers has largely
been mitigated by the threat of unemployment.68 Thus, not only does unemployment
itself mean less income and therefore more inequality, but also the simple existence of
unemployment means that wages can be forced downward, further contributing to
economic inequality.
Under a system of economic democracy, however, unemployment is not a
structural necessity in the way that it is under capitalism. The first way that this is
empirically clear is through the some of the negative consequences of hyper capitalism’s
globalization. While there are certainly positive aspects of the globalization process, the
threat of capital flight is ever present under a system of hyper capitalism, globalization,
and the power of capitalist monopolies. Economic democracy promises a much different
future. With DWs in place jobs cannot be exported overseas to cheaper labor markets like
they are under capitalism. The fear of capital flight from the United States is therefore
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quelled, unemployment can sharply decline, and the damaging affects of unemployment
will subside.69
DWs are also more naturally inclined to support the community due to investment
banks’ incentives to create employment opportunities. The basic foundation of many
existing worker cooperatives is built on the notion of providing employment
opportunities for the community that the cooperative exists in. Mondragon, the world’s
largest cooperative in the Basque Country of Spain, was established on principles of
providing employment, even though they do not have the social capital that they would
under economic democracy. This goal has remained a part of Mondragon’s charter, and
following the 2008 economic crisis, the Basque Country’s unemployment was only 15%,
compared to 25% in the rest of Spain.70 The combination of the egalitarian principles of
DWs and public investment banks’ concerns with job creation will spur a much greater
expectation and realization of employment under economic democracy. Furthermore,
given the ever-evolving realm of technological advancement, DWs can actively work
with investment banks to roll over their present assets in order to develop and maintain
pace with these budding technologies.
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Lastly, the structure of economic democracy’s DWs and social control of
investment all help to keep DWs relatively small in comparison to today’s mega
corporations. Under capitalism, expansion means larger profit for the company, which
means greater pay for the owners. However, under economic democracy, an expansion
simply means sharing a greater amount of the profit with a larger number of workers.
Thus, profit per person may not necessarily increase with expansion. Within highly
effective DWs, expansion will not be pursued, as larger DWs means less likely
democratic functioning. Expansion beyond a certain point may lead to a point of
diminishing returns for a DW. It is therefore not within the interest of the workers to
reduce their own wages or cut jobs in favor of expansion; rather, since they share profit
based on democratic deliberation, the focus of the DW will be maintain high quality of
products and the continued existence of the DW. What’s more, as Schweickart maintains,
“since firms are smaller and competition less intense under Economic Democracy than
under capitalism, it will be easier for a new start-up firm—or a retooled existing firm—to
enter the more lucrative industry.”71 Thus, the fear of losing employment due to being out
paced and absorbed by competitors falls to the wayside.
However, for those who fail to find a place within a DW, there remain several
options. The first is to establish a government agency that is responsible for assisting
those who for some reason must be laid off from a DW or cannot find participation within
a DW. These unemployed workers should be able to qualify for assistance through this
government agency and would be given the option to receive training, transfer assistance,
and additional facilities that would link them to new and growing DWs in need to
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workers. The two—new or understaffed DWs and unemployed individuals—could be
jointly linked through this agency and paired with one another given both the DW’s and
person’s interest in the DW.
The second possibility for the unemployed is to develop a model in which groups
of unemployed individual can receive assistance through a specified government agency
to develop their own start up DW. Rather than unemployment compensation over an
extended period of time, those who are unemployed should be given the option of
receiving the full amount of compensation at front, so long as they can use those
resources with a collective of other individuals to establish a DW. This aspect will
immediately provide employment, thus reducing inequality, and help cut costs in the long
run, as the economic participation of these individuals and their DW will take affect
immediately, as opposed to an extended period of unemployment and low engagement
with the local economy.
The third option follows form Schweickart’s model of economic democracy
wherein the government is “the employer-of-last-resort.”72 He notes that there are several
areas in which the government can maintain this type of employer-of-last-resort model,
especially in the sectors of childcare, community improvement, environmental cleanup
and ecological development.73 This consideration is valuable in system of economic
democracy where the community is a considerably more important aspect of society.
Developing childcare, elderly care, and health care providers into public institutions
allows for this type of model, where those who are unable to secure a position within a
DW have the option of being trained to help support those in need.
72
73

Schweickart, After Capitalism, 103.
Ibid., 103-4.

63
This type of employment model can help mitigate the negative impact of
expensive childcare, lack of elderly care options, and rising spending on health care. In a
society where the turnover rate of daycare employees is well beyond 30 percent in most
large cities, more well-trained, better-paid childcare workers can provide a benefit to all
of society, while reaping the benefits of employment.74 Additionally, given that the per
capita health expenditure of an individual increases nearly three times after the age of 65,
there is an obvious need for elderly care and access to health care for the elderly.75 In
maintaining a large system of government employers who can focus on childcare, elderly
care, and healthcare, costs can be maintained and the days of lack of access to all types of
care can be all but eliminated.
What’s more, given the ecological condition of many places with high
unemployment, low-skilled ecological cleanup and improvement positions could be
available, creating a communal aspect to unemployment. Again, while the prospect of
unemployment is considerably lower in economic democracy, it is vital to support those
who may be disabled or simply enable to secure a DW position to still be actively
engaged in the community in which they live, providing both work and significance to
their livelihoods. As Schweickart puts it, “Since unemployment is not necessary to
Economic Democracy as it is to capitalism, full employment is possible under the former,
but not the latter.”76 If full employment is possible, then so is a significant reduction in
economic inequality, and so too is a guarantee of economically secure futures for all
members of society.
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The fourth aspect of economic democracy that will mitigate the threat of
unemployment is that DWs will enable a shortened workweek, thus relieving
employment pressures. With the average American worker now working 46.7 hours per
week, and with salaried employees working beyond 49 hours per week, economic
democracy and the structure of DWs offers a much less strenuous model.77 First, because
employees are no longer beholden to wages and salaries in DWs, there does not remain
the incentive to work unproductive hours that exists under capitalism. Since the profit
made by the DW is democratically apportioned to the workers, overwork is unnecessary.
If it takes 20 hours per week to actualize the profit goals of a DW, then this opens
employment opportunities for other individuals, and reduces the workweek for all. As we
have previously identified, the long working hours and stress of the American capitalist
worker leads to shorter life expectancy, increased risk for disease, and missed working
days due to illness, ultimately leading to less productivity.78
Capitalism does not offer its workers relief that should come from laborsaving
technologies. Instead, a decrease in working hours is sacrificed for an increase in
productivity. Under economic democracy, Schweickart suggests that “we would expect to
see, over time, various patterns develop, some firms opting for more leisure, some for
higher incomes.”79 Nonetheless, the point remains that the choice for leisure or
consumption will be available for people to decide based on their personal preference.
When the threats generated by inequality disappear, the taste for leisure time—for time to
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create art, to engage in politics, to engage in the community, to raise one’s children, to
develop a craft, to explore one’s passion—may in fact outweigh the need for
consumption over time. However, until that possibility is made available, the
economically disadvantaged are stuck in the capitalist model of work for survival and
need-based consumption.

IV. Self-Worth and Distrust
Under economic democracy, a person’s self-worth will not be tied to one’s
economic value; rather, it will be linked to an individual’s creative, innovative, and
personal contribution to society. On this note, we must consider the self-worth and socialworth benefits of an economically democratic society. As mentioned in chapter one, there
is a strong correlation between economic inequality and lower life expectancy among
high-income economies, even between those who are economically well off. This has
been largely attributed to the negative effects of stress that is generated from “status
differences” and “status competition”.80 Under a system of economic democracy,
however, with a decrease in economic inequality, we should also see the rapid reduction
of the negative stress effects of status competition.
First, the narrowing of the economic gap will significantly reduce the pressures
associated with the monetary worth of individuals. Second, under the DW model,
workplaces will no longer operate as an authoritarian firm. The workers will have
democratic control of the workplace, and therefore the status competition that comes with
intense power differentials within the workplace will dissipate. Self-worth is therefore
80
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restored under a system of economic democracy—no longer will the pressures of
matching one’s economically superior neighbor be a deadly factor in daily life.
Thirdly, as discussed, autonomy within the workplace is a key factor to
productivity, as an LRN study demonstrated that workplaces with a “high level of
freedom” were 10-times more likely to outperform other firms who reported lower values
of freedom and autonomy.81 The DW model is one where autonomy is key, where
democratic participation means that individuals have a say as to what his or her place
within the DW will be. The autonomous nature of this system not only provides the
feeling of self-worth, as each individual is an integral and valued voice within the DW,
but it will likely be drastically more efficient than the present capitalist mode of
operation.
Lastly, the issue of social distrust and the sundering of communities due to economic
inequality can be significantly reduced under economic democracy. With greater equality
comes greater trust. The correlations between people’s opinions on whether or not “most
people can be trusted” and how economically unequal a country is are well
documented.82 We find that the more unequal a country, the more people are untrusting
of others. Because of this, we can look to economic democracy to be a solution to this
devastating issue. Not only are communities more valued under economic democracy
than they presently are (this is due to the need for communities to be more politically
engaged under economic democracy), but also the reduction of economic inequality
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means the increase in levels of trust between individuals. If we can tap into a more
trusting communal attitude towards others, then the act of political engagement for
oneself and the good of society can be attained much more easily.
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IV. How Do We Get There?

The all-important question then looms: what will it take to make economic
democracy a reality? The physical and violent working class revolutions of the past 200
years are no longer viable, nor are they desirable. The economic elite will not willingly
cede power, nor can we rely on a subversive military effort on the part of the
disenfranchised public. Sustainable solutions for stable societies must take the form of
non-violent, culturally pervasive movements, wherein the comfort that we have attained
through the consumptive nature of capitalism is set aside in order to realize a more
equitable, free, democratic, and ultimately desirable future. Cultivating a post-capitalist
world must therefore take place throughout multiple facets of society—it must be
economic, cultural, social, and technological. These features must evolve in tandem with
one another if we are to actualize a system beyond capitalism, as capitalism itself has a
firm grasp on all aspects of social and personal life. If we are to defeat the damaging
costs of economic inequality, we must be willing to change all aspects of life that the
capitalist system vitiates.
While the process of achieving economic democracy is certainly a long an
arduous task, as it asks to uproot many of the fundamental components of everyday
functions, there are several key steps that we can take to move beyond capitalism. Much
in the same way that economic democracy may be a type of transition between capitalism
and a more pluralist, democratically regulated type society, we can take several steps in
transition between capitalism and economic democracy. In this transitional state, we may
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look towards David Schweickart’s model of transitional market socialism as a type of
stepping-stone to bridge the gap between capitalism and economic democracy.
I mention a post-market style society only to mention that I am aware of the
debate among socialists, and while I agree that an eventual utopian non-market society is
desirable, there is much to be done between now and this kind of a future. This is to say
that economic democracy is not the end-all-be-all; no system should be. To contend, as
many capitalists do, that this is the best system that we have to offer our fellow humans is
to fall victim to the constraints of the present, blinding us from moving ever onward
towards a more equitable, happy, and progressive society.
Schweickart sees three ways in which a system of economic democracy can rise,
through what he calls “radical quick,” “radical slower,” and “slower still” conditions for
transition.83 The first two options are perhaps too drastic to either be politically viable or
economically sustainable as they require rapid movement towards nationalization, largely
without concern for the beneficiaries of the current model. His “radical quick” model
establishes national banks, reforms all enterprises into worker owned enterprises, creates
the capital assets tax, and dissolves the stock market immediately.84 The “radical slower”
transitional model employees the same principles of the first model, except that worker
self-management only applies to corporations, and provides an annuity up to a certain
amount for those who have assets in the stock market.85 Without taking into account both
the economic considerations and the blowback of those who benefit from the present
system, Schweickart’s first two movements would be hard to actualize. His third
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transitional model is much more inclusive and aware of the economic elite, as they are
the one’s who hold the power to make political transition possible. What’s more, he
considers this third model a transitional period in which we can reach economic
democracy “without a financial meltdown,” a desirable outcome for nearly everyone.86
This third option relies on the use of the Meidner Plan, a system developed in
Sweden in the 1970’s by prominent Swedish economist and labor union supporter Rudolf
Meidner. Under this plan, all companies who have more than fifty employees must
develop a new stockholder system in which 20 percent of the company’s yearly profits
are turned over to the employees in the form of shares in the company.87 Schweickart lays
out the consequences of such legislation:

These shares would be held in a “labor trust,” collectively owned by all wage
earners. Shares would not be sold. In due time—Meidner estimated thirty-five
years or so—most firms would come to have the majority of their stock owned by
the trust, that is, collectively by Swedish workers.88

What’s more, overtime it will become necessary to dissolve the stock market so as
to develop the publically owned social investment fund. In doing so, we can look to
Schweickart’s policy of providing government annuities—payments over an extended
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period of time—for those who currently own stock in the stock market.89 The basic
premise of this plan that while the stock market will be absorbed by society as a whole,
there should be a specified amount of money that will be paid to the current owners of
stocks. Institutional investors can be rolled over into the public banking institution, being
paid a set portion of their investment as an annuity over time, and the rest of that social
capital rolled back through the government and eventually to their own institutions as
public banks. For individuals, Schweickart sets an arbitrary value of $400,000 as the cap,
but this cap should be wrestled with and discussed among democratic participants.90 In
doing so, a transition to economic democracy does not seek to punish capitalists for
investing, nor does it maintain the status quo. These annuities that are paid to individuals
should cease upon his or her death, and the value of those assets should be rolled back
into the social investment fund. In doing so, we can work towards a slow dispersing of
the stock market into a publically owned investment fund for equitable use.
This option is clearly only possible with the support of a far left government, one
in which representatives’ feet are not held to the fire by large corporations. Thus, it is
evident that moving towards campaign finance reform and publicly funded elections is
also a key to this transitional period. Thankfully, this dialogue is already in the collective
consciousness of many American citizens. The relative success of Bernie Sanders’ 2016
Democratic nomination campaign (and even to some extent the Trump campaign’s
criticisms of capital flight) has set a precedent for anti-establishment, anti-corporate
politics. The mere fact that a candidate for president of the United States can run as a
self-proclaimed “democratic socialist” in the post-Cold War era is a sign that the present
89
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system is not working, and that the American people are ready and willing to seek
alternatives.
Thus, bringing into power a left government, open to the ideas discussed here, is
not out of the question. Instead, it is only a matter of time and a matter of whether or not
that strong left government takes the shape of a Bernie Sanders-like approach—one
supported by large numbers of the public as opposed to corporate sponsorship. If this
were to occur, then a movement towards economic democracy could materialize. It
would likely involve a revitalization of the labor union movement and a serious
recognition of both the value of proper decentralization and the benefits of a strong
governmental support apparatus.
In truth, however, it may be more likely that a government concerned with these
issues comes from a newly formed third party rather than the present Democratic party
whose established reputation, along with the GOP, simply has too much at stake in the
corporate sector. With this being said, it is clear that the era of a two party system in the
United States is falling by the wayside, with an increasingly disgruntled populace left
looking for non-establishment options. A third party must emerge as a type of people’s
party—one in which corporations and lobbyists have little to no buying power. Without
an emergent independent third party, a system of economic democracy will struggle to be
realized, as those who are in positions of power are the beneficiaries of the current model,
not the future one.
This of course answers only the political question of how we get from point A to
point B. Political reform and revolutionary political movements are not simply
spontaneous, independent crusades. Rather, they are the nascent result of social and
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cultural activities. The populace must be culturally ready and willing to elect a third party
with visions of economic democracy. To do so, we must work to produce a cultural
atmosphere that is already working towards principles of economic democracy. In many
ways this is already the case—from the disdain for corporate capitalism to the trendy,
new “hipster” culture that advocates for strengthen local markets in places like Portland,
Austin, Williamsburg, Brooklyn, and Seattle.
In the spirit of this new culture, we should work to build a system that promotes
DWs in the same way that modern movements of organic, free-range, and non-GMO
foods have cropped up. The underlying sensibility behind these shifts in consumption is a
concern with the ethical and health implications of our consumerist tendencies. The freerange and organic movements have been largely successful in creating a trend that has
forced the hand of larger corporations to meet these standards.91 Whether large
corporations are doing so for altruistic reasons or not, there is clearly a profit incentive to
be gained through the organic and free-range movement. For the most part, it has been
largely beneficial.
In the same vein, imagine if we could create a culture of buying products
produced by cooperatives or firms with significant democratic worker participation.
Regulations that stipulate the labeling of non-GMO, free-range, and organic foods could
also be instituted on products to label whether or not they come from “Democratically
Run” companies. By paralleling this movement with that of the organic, free-range
movements, we could see a spike in sales for products produced in new or already

91

U.S. Department of Agriculture, “Consumer demand drives growth in the organic food
sector,” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, February
8, 2013, http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=35003.

74
existing cooperative movements. The label “Democratically Run” on commodities could
therefore be a catalyst for larger corporations to move towards this model as concern with
supporting local and democratic businesses rises. In doing so, not only do the principles
of DWs become more of a trend, but it also forces the hand of corporations to follow suit
if they are to be competitive in the modern era. Of course, this is not to suggest that we
should look towards a society where “democratically run” products are simply sold in
large, undemocratic stores. We should also be conscientious enough to make an effort to
popularize a movement towards locally owned, relatively small democratic stores to sell
“democratically run” products. Being cognizant of both the products as well as the stores
themselves, we can move towards a culture where stores themselves are advertised and
promoted as “democratically run”.
Similarly, the institution of a public jobs program, analogous to that of the New
Deal, could be implemented with a specific focus on the development of DWs. Along
with aspirations for green technologies, a DW focused jobs program could open the door
to a world of DWs that are competitive with modern capitalist firms. By offering DWs
temporary tax exemptions, technological and technical assistance, and turning current
corporate subsidies over to DWs, a new jobs program could help turn the tide towards
economic democracy.
Another key ingredient to achieving economic democracy is to work towards a
democratized form of media. With six corporations controlling nearly 90% of all
American media, the time has come to deconstruct these economically, and therefore
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politically, elite outlets of information dissemination.92 Information is power, and so long
as information remains in the hands of a select few, any political movement outside of the
current establishment will find it hard pressed to access the most popular channels of
information distribution. There are several key ways in which we can empower other
forms of media, thus dismantling the power of traditional media outlets. We must
advocate for a continuation of the present trend of small-scale media outlets providing
information through websites such as YouTube. Small but sustainable media sources
have begun to provide alternative arenas for news consumption, often times attracting
incredibly large audiences (e.g. The Young Turks, Secular Talk, The Rubin Report, The
Laura Flanders Show, etc.). The value in this endeavor is that it is truly democratic in
nature. The Internet is perhaps the most unique example of true democratic participation
in human history, as views, likes, comments, and information sharing has become the
way in which individuals within a society can “cast” his or her vote on cultural issues.
Clearly there is room for improvement and growth of these news media outlets, and we
should look for ways to encourage the development of independent news media.
Lastly, if we are to see economic democracy into the world, there must be a
unified cultural and political movement that espouses the beliefs discussed in this section
and throughout this work. The Occupy movement that followed the 2008 economic crisis
appeared to serve this type of function, but a lack of leadership and clear goals
diminished this valuable opportunity. By this time, the movement itself still exists, but it
has fallen into specific pockets of the Internet, failing to gain enough steam to continue as
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a physical movement. Nonetheless, the Occupy movement was a good stepping-stone
towards a momentous revolutionary call to action. Whether it goes by the name of
“Occupy” or not, the next campaign of disenfranchised and dismayed citizens must be
ready and armed with the solutions to the problems.
The International Monetary Fund and other prominent organizations have
predicted an austere future, often alluding to another impending economic collapse.93 The
forthcoming rupture of the student loan bubble, the result of those with skyrocketing debt
continuing to move into the workforce, may in fact dwarf the 2008 housing market crash.
In preparation for such a collapse, as capitalism has shown to produce time and time
again, we must be equipped with a set of goals and a unified leadership that can produce
a movement based around moving beyond capitalism. The solutions demonstrated in this
work can be used as a springboard for other conceptions and objectives of a postcapitalist world. We must occupy and have a framework for the democratic and
collaborative development of a blueprint for a world beyond capitalism.
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